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 • The automotive industry was the driving force of Germany’s eco‑
nomic growth during the past two decades. In 1999–2017, German 
firms became the leading manufacturers owing to foreign expan‑
sion, and their share in the global market grew from 15.1% to 18.5%. 
Car manufacturers and their subcontractors employ 1.8  million 
people. This is one of Germany’s most profitable sectors of industry 
(80% of premium cars sold worldwide are made in factories belong‑
ing to German manufacturers) and it generates a significant share 
of the demand for the products and services of other vital sectors of 
the country’s economy, such as the electromechanical, chemical and 
logistics sectors. This concerns above all the giant automotive clus‑
ter in southern Germany (Bavaria and Baden ‑Württemberg), where 
orders from car manufacturers are sometimes the only source of 
income for many firms.
 • The German economy had already begun to visibly slow down in 2019, 
and so before the COVID‑19 epidemic, mainly due to the deteriorat‑
ing condition of the automotive industry. All companies announced 
that they would restructure their factories in Germany, and sub‑
contractors intended to shut down their plants or cut employment 
levels. Until 2019, the car companies still generated good financial 
results and had high sales but their strength was based on those of 
the past. Global trade wars and political tension undermined the 
development model pursued by German car manufacturers which 
was based on highly effective global supply chains capitalising on 
the competitive advantages of certain regions of the world. The Ger‑
man automotive industry has also been adversely affected by the 
ecolo gical revolution, forcing it to withdraw from its specialisation, 
i.e. the production of cars with combustion engines (especially those 
with a diesel engine). German companies have to master the manu‑
facturing technology of electric cars, while having no advantage over 













losing its status of a pioneer in new technologies linked, for example, 
with car digitalisation and developing autonomous driving systems.
 • The German automotive sector did not react to new challenges in 
time. The car manufacturers’ response was quite arrogant – some 
of the moves linked to environmental protection were feigned and 
some major social and technological changes were not taken seri‑
ously. This affected the firms’ image and led to the imposition of 
heavy restrictions on the entire sector. The German government’s 
approach contributed to that. Formally, the government supported 
imposing stricter ecological regulations on the automotive sector 
but was nevertheless applying the brakes to this process behind the 
scenes, thus reducing the pressure on innovation. The Volkswagen 
diesel emissions scandal compromised the automotive sector’s efforts 
to make its production more environmentally friendly and also cre‑
ated an atmosphere of public support for imposing stricter standards 
on the industry, especially in the case of vehicles with a diesel engine.
 • The strengths developed by German vehicle manufacturers so far 
include: a  highly reputed brand, well ‑developed distribution net‑
work, in‑depth market knowledge and a strong financial position. 
These enabled them to cope with individual problems. However, the 
concentration of the numerous challenges is extremely risky for 
them. In the worst ‑case scenario the German automotive industry 
may even plunge into a long ‑term crisis which will seriously affect its 
global position. Furthermore, there is a risk of serious job cuts in the 
countries which are important links in its supply chain. The effects 
of this may include: the German economy losing a major share of its 
added value, economic and even political destabilisation, and Germa‑













I. THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY IS (NO LONGER) 
THE DRIVING FORCE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN GERMANY
If not for the automotive sector, the German economy would not have 
grown uninterruptedly for almost a decade. German car manufactur‑
ers have been among the world’s most profitable companies for years. 
Furthermore, the automotive industry’s importance for the national 
economy has been growing for more than a decade. According to data 
from the Federal Statistical Office, the automotive industry generated 
3.4% of added value to Germany’s GDP in 2005, and 4.5% ten years later. 
 However, these figures fail to fully reflect the German economy’s depend‑
ence on the industry. It employs 700,000 people directly and, along with 
related sectors, even 1.8 million people indirectly. It is also one of Ger‑
many’s most profitable branches of industry (revenue per employee). 
The automotive sector does not only generate essential added value and 
a significant number of workplaces in Germany – it also generates the 
demand for products manufactured by industries which are vital for 
the country’s economy: the electromechanical, chemical and logistics 
industries. Vehicle manu facturers are often the main and sometimes 
the only clients for many of Germany’s small and medium ‑sized subcon‑
tractors. As the automotive sector was developing in southern Germany 
(especially in Bavaria and Baden ‑Württemberg) for decades, a powerful 
automotive cluster has been formed. Within this cluster a large group 
of subcontractors are concentrated around vehicle manufacturers.
The  German economic boom on the global market would have been 
impossible without the automotive industry, which is one of the most 
internationalised industries of the German economy. In 2014, Volkswa‑
gen outpaced General Motors, and became the world’s second largest 
vehicle manufacturer in terms of sales value, and it came very close to 
outpacing the global leader, Toyota, in the past few years. The German 
automotive sector has won an especially strong position in the premium 













In 2009–2016, the share of the Chinese market in global sales of new 
vehicles grew rapidly – from 17% to 34%. This way it became the world’s 
largest automotive market in 2010. During this period, German vehicle 
manufacturers increased their share in this market from 18.6% to 21.1%.1
Chart 1. Germany’s surplus in commodities trade with individual coun‑
tries and the section of this generated by the trade in vehicles and vehicle 
parts in 20182
Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, www.destatis.de.
The automotive sector played even a more important role in generat‑
ing Germany’s trade surplus. In 2017, German exports of vehicles and 
vehicle components reached the value of 234 billion euros (18.4% of total 
export turnover), while the value of imports of vehicles and vehicle 
parts reached only 113 billion euros (11.2% of import turnover).3 Thus the 
1 Der Pkw-Absatzmarkt China 2009 bis 2015 Analyse der Bedeutung Chinas für die deut-
sche Automobilindustrie, E&Y, 2016.
2 According to the Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS), Poland generates a sur‑
plus of 9 billion euros in trade with Germany, while in the Federal Statistical Office’s 
opinion, Germany generates a surplus of 8 billion euros in trade with Poland. GUS 
explains this is an effect of the different methodologies applied, but the two offices 
have not reached a compromise concerning standardising the manner of data pres‑
entation that would best reflect reality (cf.  response from the deputy president 
of GUS to parliamentary question no. 22326, orka2.sejm.gov.pl).
3 Author’s own calculations based on Fakten zum deutschen Außenhandel, Federal 
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balance of trade in the automotive industry’s products – worth 121 billion 
euros – was the main source (45%) of Germany’s trade surplus. Manu‑
facturers of vehicles and vehicle parts generated 30–50% of Germany’s 
surplus in the commodities trade (see chart 1) with such countries as 
the United States, Sweden, United Kingdom and Italy. The situation was 
slightly different in the case of such countries as Austria or Poland which 
reached a surplus or equal level of trade in vehicle products with Ger‑
many. However, this was due to the fact that these countries were major 
suppliers for the German automotive industry.
The automotive industry triggers not only the competitiveness but also 
the innovativeness of the German economy. It accounted for 40% of all 
patent applications submitted in Germany in 2015 alone.4 The greatest 
amount of innovations originate not from the vehicle manufacturers 
themselves (36%) but rather from their subcontractors (64%). German 
automotive companies are also highly innovative on the global scale. 
In 2017, Germany was ranked as the most innovative country in this area, 
accounting for 32% of innovations in the global automotive sector and 
outpacing vehicle manufacturers from China (18%), Japan (17%) and the 
USA (11%).5 The problem is, however, that many German patents have 
nothing to do with cutting ‑edge technologies. In 2015, around 30% of pat‑
ents in the German automotive sector were linked to innovations con‑
cerning conventionally fuelled vehicles. According to statistical data 
from 2017, only 1–3% of innovations in the German automotive sector 
regard electromobility. As communication with other devices is gaining 
significance, the nature of the rivalry is changing, and hence the IT sec‑
tor tycoons are becoming more and more serious competitors.
4 O. Koppel, T. Puls, E. Röben, IW-Report 34/18. Die Patentleistung der deutschen KFZ-
-Unternehmen, German Economic Institute based in Cologne, September 2018, p. 12, 
www.iwkoeln.de.














The sales of the German automotive industry noticeably fell (by 2.5%) 
in 2018, for the first time since the global financial crisis.6 The sector 
which over the past decade had accustomed everyone to record ‑high 
sales worldwide, was now providing surprises of more and consistently 
worse news, principally all year long in 2019. This adversely affected 
the subcontractors. Schaeffler was forced to reduce its staff ’s working 
hours due to an insufficient number of orders. Bosch announced redun‑
dancies. Continental and Mahle intend to close one factory in Germany 
each.  German vehicle manufacturers also need to deal with problems. 
The  largest companies are planning restructuring and higher invest‑
ments in new technologies. In the coming years, Audi and Daimler intend 
to cut around 10,000  jobs each, Volkswagen will cut 5,000–7,000  jobs, 
Continental 7,000, and BMW 2,000–4,000. In turn, Bosch is considering 
reducing its level of employment by 3,500. As the demand for combustion 
vehicles falls, around 50,000 employees will be made redundant and 20% 
of German subcontractors will face bankruptcy.7 Therefore, it is not sur‑
prising that the leading politicians are increasingly concerned about the 
situation. Chancellor Angela Merkel already in 2018 made a statement 
in the Bundestag that was understood as a warning to the automotive 
industry. She said then that uncorrected mistakes may easily turn into 
systemic problems as was the case with Nokia, once a  leading mobile 
phone manufacturer, which is now only a shadow of the corporation it 
used to be.
6 P. Fuß, C.M. Gall, Die Automobilindustrie in Deutschland 2018: Umsatz- und Beschäfti-
gungsentwicklung, wichtigste Auslandsmärkte, E&Y, 2019, p. 4.













II. THE GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY  
AS THE GREATEST VICTIM OF THE VOLATILITY 
IN GLOBAL TRADE
Until recently, Germany was one of the greatest beneficiaries of the 
open globalisation model owing to the foreign expansion of vehicle 
manufacturers, followed by their subcontractors. The market boom was 
very skilfully used by German vehicle manufacturers, which created 
a global network of factories with optimal locations worldwide in the 
regions of key importance for the automotive industry. German politi‑
cians for years rejected reproaches for the excessive trade surplus and 
the economy’s excessive reliance on the situation in the automotive sec‑
tor. The hothouse conditions which enabled German vehicle manufac‑
turers to achieve a c. 18% share in the global market are ceasing to exist. 
Trade is becoming tougher with the three most important markets for 
the  German automotive sector: the USA (exports of vehicles and vehicle 
parts to this country are worth 27 billion euros), China (25 billion euros) 
and the United Kingdom (22.5 billion euros).
Chart 2. German vehicle manufacturers’ domestic and foreign produc‑
tion in 1999 and 2017
Source: Verband der Automobilindustrie, www.vda.de.
The German automotive industry has gained global reach over the past 
two decades. While in  1999 German companies’ factories located in 

























Germany manufactured 80% more vehicles than their foreign subsid‑
iaries, this proportion was completely reversed 18 years later – in 2017 
their factories outside Germany manufactured 10.3 million vehicles, 
against those in Germany with only 5.7 million. However, this does 
not mean that the proportion of production incomes was the same. 
Domestic factories predominated in manufacturing the most valuable 
elements, such as engines and gear boxes, while numerous factories 
outside Germany operated as assembly plants, especially for cheaper 
models. This was a way, for example, to effectively pay lower customs 
duties because the tariffs on components are usually much lower than 
on finished vehicles.
1. The US-China customs war
The German automotive industry owes its success to a great extent to 
the skilful building of complex supply chains, capitalising, for example, 
on low labour costs in China and Mexico, which enabled its international 
expansion. Even though the EU is not formally involved in the US‑China 
customs war,8 the German automotive industry is already becoming one 
of the greatest victims of this conflict. The trade war between the USA 
and China strongly affects all German automotive companies whose 
major plants are located in those countries. The German automotive 
industry may suffer especially great losses due to retaliatory customs 
duty imposed by China on vehicle imports from the USA because more 
than half of these vehicles are manufactured by German companies 
in their US factories.9 German corporations and their subcontractors 
employ 80,000 people in the US. The key production plants of German 
manufacturers’ SUVs sold worldwide are located in the USA. This was 
a very conscious strategy. Firstly, a great number of SUVs are sold in 
the USA, so economies of scale could be achieved. Secondly, it was less 
8 J. Jakóbowski, ‘A stalemate in US–China trade negotiations: the tariff war and tech‑
nology sanctions’, OSW Commentary, no. 303, 28 May 2019, www.osw.waw.pl.
9 C. Giesen, ‘Handelskrieg zwischen USA und China bedroht deutsche Firmen’, Süd‑













viable to manufacture vehicles, for example in China, given the need to 
offer part of the profit (sometimes the larger one) to Chinese partners, 
and co‑operation with them was a precondition to enter the Chinese 
market.
In July 2018, China imposed a 35% customs duty on vehicles imported 
from the USA; it was suspended towards the end of 2018. The sales of 
German vehicles in China did not fall most likely owing to the de‑escala‑
tion of the dispute and Beijing’s temporary withdrawal from the import 
duty. The  sales on the US market were adversely affected by the cus‑
toms duty imposed by President Donald Trump on steel and aluminium 
leading to increasing production costs in German companies’ vehicle 
and vehicle part factories located in the USA. According to estimates, 
as a result of the duty imposed on steel imports to the USA, the costs 
incurred by the German economy linked to customs duty rose from 
22 million euros to 400 million euros.10
The  German automotive industry has also been affected by indirect 
consequences of the US‑China trade war. In the past two decades, the 
Chinese market generated the highest growth in the sales of German 
vehicle manufacturers and their subcontractors. It was exports to China 
that balanced the slower growth rate of German vehicle sales on highly 
developed markets, especially at the time of the global economic crisis 
and the eurozone crisis. The situation may change radically in the com‑
ing years because the slump on the Chinese market is rapidly deteriorat‑
ing due to the spiral of customs duties imposed by the USA and China. 
Vehicle sales in China dropped by 4% in 2018 and by 9.5% in 2019. These 
data are extremely worrying to the German automotive industry, espe‑
cially given the fact that China is the world’s largest market for vehicle 
sales (50%  larger than the US) in which German manufacturers hold 
a high (24%) share. According to some estimates, the US‑China trade war 
10 US-Zölle auf Stahl und Aluminium – Bedeutung für Bayern und Deutschland, Vereini‑













will lead to the number of vehicles sold worldwide in 2018–2024 falling 
by 35 million. This will mean that the automotive industry’s incomes 
will be reduced by 700 billion euros. As much as 83% of the difference 
will be an effect of the slump in China.11 The US‑China trade war has 
also affected the flexibility of German vehicle manufacturers’ response 
to fluctuations in demand. For example, BMW manufactures most of 
its SUVs in US factories. Usually the output is sufficient to satisfy the 
demand on this market. However, in the case of a rapid growth of sales 
in the United States, the company was able to supply more vehicles from 
its factories located in Germany and China. The present higher tariffs 
may limit this way of optimising the supply chain.
Chart 3. Vehicle and vehicle part sale value and growth rate on the Ger‑
man industry’s largest sale markets in 2018
Source: P.  Fuß, C.M.  Gall, Die Automobilindustrie in Deutschland 2018: Umsatz- und 
 Beschäftigungsentwicklung, wichtigste Auslandsmärkte, E&Y, 2019, pp. 10–11.
Even though the upward trend in German vehicle manufacturers’ sales 
continued in 2018, this could be linked to the extraordinary measures 
taken by Beijing to sustain the favourable market conditions. This could 
also be linked to the fact that some consumers decided to buy a car ear‑
lier than they had planned, fearing new tariffs. The situation was not as 
11 F. Dudenhöffer, ‘Schaden von mehr als 700 Mrd. Euro durch Trump‘schen Zollkriege 
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good on other markets that are important for the German automotive 
sector. As illustrated in chart 3, German vehicles’ sales dropped signif‑
icantly on seven out of ten of these markets. German vehicle and vehi‑
cle part manufacturers could hope for an increase only in China (14%), 
Poland (3%) and the Netherlands (3%).
2. The NAFTA reform
The reform of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
its transformation in 2020 into the United States–Mexico–Canada Agree‑
ment (USMCA) will bring about costly changes in the German auto‑
motive sector’s supply chains. Mexico has become a major production 
centre for German companies and their subcontractors over the past 
decades. Vehicles manufactured there have been sold on the US market. 
Audi, Bosch, Continental and Volkswagen already have plants there, and 
BMW and Mercedes are building ones. For those reasons terms of trade 
between the USMCA countries are very important for the German auto‑
motive sector. Goods will have to meet stricter conditions to be exempted 
from customs duty as part of trade within the bloc. The required share 
of components manufactured in the countries belonging to the group 
in the final product will be raised from 62.5% to 75%. This change may 
adversely affect the European factories of all the German manufactur‑
ers which have so far predominantly manufactured the most expensive 
parts (such as engines and gear boxes) in Germany. Another requirement 
is that a minimum wage must be ensured so that goods can be traded 
duty ‑free between the USMCA countries – at least 40–45% of the staff 
should earn at least a minimum of $16 per hour. The NAFTA reform will 
thus undermine German vehicle manufacturers’ price competitiveness 
on the USMCA markets. Furthermore, in many cases they will be forced 
to move a greater part of their production to these countries than has 
previously been the case. As a result of these changes the direct benefits 
for the German economy offered by the sale of vehicles in North  America 
will be reduced because the opportunities of exporting vehicles and vehi‑













It  is also unclear whether President Trump’s threats to impose a duty 
on vehicles imported from the EU will be carried through. Since the 
beginning of his term the US president has criticised Germany for 
flooding the US market and importing amounts of American vehicles.12 
In 2018 alone, the USA exported vehicles worth $3 billion to the EU and 
imported vehicles worth $34  billion. The  automotive industry is the 
main source of Germany’s good results in trade with the USA.13 Sales of 
vehicles and vehicle parts accounts for 32% of German exports to the US 
market.14 For this reason, Germany was among those EU member states 
which insisted the most that Brussels de‑escalate the trade dispute with 
the USA. In  July 2018 Trump agreed to withdraw from imposing new 
trade restrictions, at least temporarily. At  the same time he rejected 
the proposal to lift all customs duties on the trade of vehicles between 
the US and the EU, which had been put forward by the President of the 
European Commission, Jean‑Claude Juncker. This in spite of the fact that, 
theoretically, it would have been beneficial to US manufacturers because 
customs duties on vehicles imposed by the EU are higher than the tar‑
iffs applicable in the USA.15 Trump argued that European consumers are 
committed to their brands, and tariff reduction would not change much. 
Some German experts view his threats as an attempt to force the EU to 
open up its market more to US agricultural products because farmers 
form a major group of Trump’s electorate. In 2019, Trump repeatedly 
postponed the date of the final decision to recognise vehicle imports 
from the EU as a threat to the national interest, and this move would 
12 K. Bradsher, J. Ewing, ‘Trump Attacks BMW and Mercedes, but Auto Industry Is 
a Complex Target’, The New York Times, 16 January 2017, www.nytimes.com.
13 The USA is the largest outlet for German exporters and generates the largest share 
of the German trade surplus (50.5 billion euros; 20% of the surplus).
14 K. Popławski, ‘Obawy Niemiec przed wojną handlową z USA’, 14 March 2018, www.osw.
waw.pl.
15 There is a  clear imbalance: the EU imposes an average customs tariff of 5.2% on 
goods imported from the USA, while the average import duty on goods sold from 
the EU to the USA is 3.5%. This disproportion is even bigger in the case of the auto‑
motive industry’s products. A 10% duty is imposed on vehicles and parts imported 
from the USA to the EU, while the USA imposes a smaller tariff of 2.5% on goods 
bought from the EU. If Trump increased the tariff to 25%, German companies would 













have provided the grounds for imposing as much as a 25% duty on vehi‑
cles imported from the EU.
3. Brexit
The  problems of the German automotive industry include not only 
global disputes but also the costs linked to Brexit. The United Kingdom 
participating in the single EU market became an  important element 
of the German companies’ supply chain, especially given the fact that 
British brands were beaten by the European competition. At present, 
many  British subcontractors supply components to German vehicle 
manufacturers.
Already in  2015, i.e.  before the Brexit referendum results were an‑
nounced, the United Kingdom was the third most important outlet for 
German exports as a whole (after the United States and France). Ger‑
man exporters generated the second largest trade surplus on this mar‑
ket: 51 billion euros. However, Germany’s surplus on the British market 
was reduced by 12% (to 45 billion euros) in 2018. The United Kingdom 
imported 800,000 vehicles from Germany – the most of all the coun‑
tries worldwide, and this was linked to its participation in the single EU 
market. For the same reason it is also the most important market for the 
German sector of automobile subcontractors. They manufacture parts 
for 50% of German vehicles and 8% of other vehicles originating from 
the EU sold in the United Kingdom, which translates into 43,000 jobs 
in Germany.16 The situation on non‑EU markets is different – Germany 
must build local plants there. The automotive sector is already Germa‑
ny’s greatest victim (along with the pharmaceutical sector) of the confu‑
sion caused by Brexit. While the value of German exports to the United 
Kingdom was reduced by 8% in 2015–2018, in the case of the automotive 
sector it fell by 23% (a loss worth 6 billion euros) and in the case of the 
16 Harter Brexit und die Lieferkette  – Effekte auf deutsche Automobilzulieferer, Deloitte 













pharmaceutical sector by as much as 41% (3 billion euros).17 This is not 
only an effect of the uncertainty about the form of future EU‑UK rela‑
tions (which has adversely affected the situation on the British market), 
it is above all an effect of the 20% drop in the pound’s value against the 
euro over the past three years.
In the future, any form of undermining of economic relations between 
the EU and the UK will generate significant costs for the German automo‑
tive industry and the need to modify its entire supply chain. The effects 
of establishing a customs border will not be limited to the imposition 
of burdens linked to new tariffs and the estimated value of these will 
be 0.5  billion euros annually.18 Potential border crossing delays may 
upset the continuity of German companies’ supplies and in effect force 
them to build new factories in the UK and limit exports from Germany. 
The   British government may also introduce different technical stand‑
ards or the requirement to include a certain share of local production in 
the final product in order to force foreign manufacturers to build facto‑
ries in the UK.19 In this situation, replacing German subcontractors with 
their British competitors may be a way out for German vehicle manu‑
facturers. However, all these trends will reduce the German economy’s 
benefits generated by exports to the United Kingdom.
17 Brexit so far  – Die bisherigen Effekte auf den Standort Deutschland, Deloitte Brexit 
 Briefing 2019, no. 11, Deloitte, p. 11, www.deloitte.com.
18 If customs duties were introduced in compliance with WTO procedures, a 10% rate 
would be imposed on vehicles and a 4.5% on vehicle parts.














III. THE COSTLY CHEATING ON ‘CLEAN DIESEL’
In September 2015 it was revealed that Volkswagen had installed spe‑
cial devices in its cars to manipulate fuel emissions tests. They limited 
car performance in laboratory conditions, temporarily reducing the 
range of pollutants emitted. This scandal shook the German automo‑
tive industry and ruined the opportunity of implementing the so‑called 
‘clean diesel’ strategy on the American market and also undermined the 
reputation of this type of engine in Europe.
The scandal ruined the strategy of German vehicle manufacturers. Be‑
fore that they had hoped that diesel, originating from Germany, would 
become a technology that would be associated with ecology for a long 
time. Diesel cars typically consume less fuel and thus also emit less 
CO2. However, extremely harmful nitrogen oxides produced in the com‑
bustion process were a  problem. Until  2015, German manufacturers 
claimed that their vehicles generated only marginal quantities of these 
substances and even met the extremely high American standards. These 
assurances turned out to be untrue when Volkswagen admitted to the 
US government that devices manipulating fuel emissions during tests 
were installed in its diesel cars. It turned out in the following years that 
Volkswagen’s cheating was not an exception but rather the norm in the 
industry, and many more companies were accused of cheating on emis‑
sion tests.
The reputation of German companies was further tarnished by another 
scandal, this time revealed by Der Spiegel. In 2017, the magazine published 
information that the key German vehicle manufacturers – Audi, BMW, 
Daimler, Porsche and VW – had set up a cartel with the intention of not 
introducing more costly ecological technologies in diesel engines start‑
ing from 2006.20 A joint Vehicle Emissions Research Centre was estab‑
lished for this purpose in order to mutually coordinate actions. Foreign 













carmakers, such as Ford and Opel, were not invited to join the conspir‑
acy. Some of the firms admitted their guilt, hoping to be treated more 
leniently. In October 2017, representatives of EU and German anti ‑trust 
authorities searched the headquarters of BMW. It is currently being con‑
sidered whether Daimler or VW will be granted crown witness status in 
this case.21 The European Commission has not completed its investiga‑
tion, and there are many grounds to expect that the companies may face 
multi ‑billion euro fines.22 If the accusations prove true, the carmakers 
might lose as much as 10% of their annual income.
The scandals turned out to be a factor that has essentially undermined the 
image of the diesel engine as an ecological solution and has led to a sud‑
den decrease in its popularity. In the USA, where diesel cars accounted 
for around 3% of the total number of passenger sold cars before the 
scandal, the popularity of the diesel engine has fallen to a marginal level, 
while some analysts had expected that this share would grow to  10% 
within a decade. German vehicle manufacturers, such as Daimler and 
BMW, withdrew from offering diesel cars on the US market completely. 
The scandal affected the automotive industry in the EU to an even greater 
extent. In 2014–2018, the share of diesel cars in the total number cars sold 
in Western European countries dropped from 54 to 36%.23 The scandal 
gave rise to a wave of lawsuits brought by environmentalist organisations 
to local courts in German federal states. Local authorities were accused 
of failing to react in the face of air quality standards being exceeded in 
many cities, caused to a great extent by the large number of diesel cars.
German public opinion was especially outraged by the arrogant stance 
taken by the carmakers. They adopted a rather assertive stance and for 
a long time successfully claimed they did not have an obligation to intro‑
duce any technical changes in the vehicles sold by them in order to meet 
21 M.  Fasse, S. Menzel, ‘Hausbesuche in der Autoindustrie’, Handelsblatt, 23 Octo‑
ber 2017, www.handelsblatt.com.
22 ‘Autokartell vor möglichem Milliardenbußgeld’, Der Spiegel, 8 March 2019, 
www.spiegel.de.













the environmental norms. They were supported in this by the German 
government. Already in September 2015 the press revealed that Germany 
(along with France and the United Kingdom) had insisted on maintain‑
ing the existing form of European fuel emissions testing form (which 
was full of loopholes) so that vehicle manufacturers could circumvent 
the regulations.24 In December 2016, the German government was one 
of the seven member states’ governments accused by the European Com‑
mission of failing to implement sanctions against VW for cheating on 
vehicle emissions tests.25 The automotive industry’s image was further 
tarnished by the information that Volkswagen had conducted research 
(co‑financed by other German automakers, including Daimler) in order 
to prove that diesel was an ecological solution. This involved testing the 
harmfulness of breathing in fumes for many hours on monkeys, which 
outraged consumers worldwide.
As German public opinion began to lose confidence in automakers, fa‑
vourable conditions were created for courts to pass decisions ban‑
ning the entry of diesel vehicles to the centres of cities such as Berlin, 
Darmstadt, Hamburg and Stuttgart.26 The regulations so far applied to 
older ‑generation diesel vehicles (usually of Euro 5 and lower standards, 
predominantly manufactured before 2015). However, some cities are con‑
sidering a total ban on driving diesel vehicles in city centres. Germany is 
not an exception – regulations prohibiting diesel vehicles of older types 
from entering the city centres already apply in Brussels, Milan and Rome 
(amongst other cities), while Athens, Madrid and Paris are intending to 
impose a total ban on driving these vehicles in cities starting from 2025.27 
Many manufacturers active on the European market have announced 
the discontinuation of the production of diesel vehicles, considering the 
24 A. Neslen, ‘UK, France and Germany lobbied for flawed car emissions tests, docu‑
ments reveal’, The Guardian, 24 September 2015, www.theguardian.com.
25 A. de Carbonnel, ‘EU takes legal action against Germany, UK over VW scandal’, 
 Reuters, 8 December 2016, www.reuters.com.
26 Bußgeldkatalog 2020, www.bussgeldkatalog.org.
27 A. Bendix, ‘15 major cities around the world that are starting to ban cars’, Business 













sudden drop in popularity of this technology in the EU. Toyota made this 
decision in 2017, and Fiat, Nissan, PSA (the owner of Peugeot, Citroën 
and Opel) and Renault made similar announcements in 2018. Meanwhile, 
German companies still remain on the defensive. Only Porsche decided 
to discontinue manufacturing diesel cars. However, these cars have 
only a  14% share in the company’s production. In turn, BMW intends 
to continue manufacturing diesel vehicles for the next two decades, be‑
lieving that the tempo of the development of electric cars is overhyped. 
It also seems that diesel vehicles will continue to have a major share in 
the production of Daimler and Volkswagen in the longer run. The posi‑
tion of many German companies depends too much on the sale of diesel 
vehicles even though this technology is becoming less and less popu‑
lar. The share of diesel vehicles in German automakers’ sales rapidly 
dropped in 2014–2018: from 74% to 48% in the case of BMW, from 67% 
to 44% in the case of Audi, from 59% to 48% in the case of Daimler, and 
from 54% to 40% in the case of Volkswagen.28 The competitors of Ger‑
man car makers have also sustained losses linked to the falling popularity 
of diesel engines, but their reliance on this technology is much lower. 
The share of diesel engines in Ford’s sales on the German market shrank 
from 44% to 33% in 2014–2018, in the case of Renault from 35% to 19%, and 
in the case of Hyundai from 21% to 5%.29
Volkswagen alone has sustained losses of around 30 billion euros due to 
the penalties and court charges it had to pay as a consequence of the scan‑
dal of 2015–2018.30 Even though paying the costs was not a problem to the 
company, considering its good financial situation, this has had an impact 
on the company’s research and development expenses and, above all, on 
the image of the firm and the entire German economy. According to 
a  survey conducted by the global marketing agency Edelman (which 
28 Author’s own calculations based on data from de.statista.com.
29 In the case of Hyundai the comparison was made to data for the first half of 2018 
due to the problem with the availability of data.














analysed the consequences of the recent scandals in which German 
companies were involved31), their reputation has suffered significantly 
over the past few years.32 In 2014–2019, confidence in them dropped in 
highly developed countries (France, the United Kingdom and the USA) 
by  19  percentage points to  44%, in Germany by  16  percentage points 
to 60%, and in developing countries (Brazil, China, India and  Mexico) 
by 4 percentage points to 74%. Distrust in German firms translates into 
concrete decisions made by consumers. 37% of respondents from highly 
developed markets who had heard about the scandals declared that they 
were buying fewer products made in Germany due to the scandals and 
would only buy them if they had no alternative or they actively boycotted 
the products. The same was declared by 41% of respondents from analo‑
gous groups in developing countries. The distrust in German companies 
is intensifying even though consumers still relatively strongly believe 
in the high technological quality of these firms’ products.
Another consequence of the diesel scandal was the introduction of more 
reliable combustion and emissions tests in new vehicles starting from 
2017 (Worldwide Harmonised Light Vehicles Test Procedure, WLTP). 
This is a big problem for the entire automotive industry where manipu‑
lating measurements was the industry standard. Vehicle manufactur‑
ers hoped for a  long time that resorting to various tricks will enable 
them to circumvent EU regulations imposing the obligation on EU 
carmakers to ensure that their vehicles emit on average no more than 
95g of CO2 per km starting from 2021. According to experts’ estimates, 
31 The past few years have seen not only scandals in the German automotive sector, 
but also reputation crises on an international scale in other sectors of the German 
economy. Deutsche Bank has been a source of scandals ongoing for years mainly 
due to problems linked to corruption and the unfair treatment of customers. Bayer 
also needs to deal with reputational issues after buying the US fertiliser manufac‑
turer, Monsanto. These result from scandals linked to the potential carcinogenicity 
of glyphosate herbicides. The company may have to pay damages exceeding ten bil‑
lion dollars.














three German vehicle manufacturers (BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen33) 
may be unable to meet these standards and may have to pay fines of 
0.2  billion euros, 0.2  billion euros and 1.4  billion euros, respectively. 
The excessively low share of electric cars in their total sales is the main 
cause of these problems. According to estimates, in order to avoid pay‑
ing the fines, German companies will be forced to increase this share 
to 10–15% by 2021.34
33 Peugeot, Hyundai–Kia, Mazda and Fiat–Chrysler may also fail to meet the standards, 
while Toyota, Renault–Nissan, Volvo, Honda and Jaguar–Land‑Rover are unlikely 
to have the problem (Cf. C. Sackmann, ‘Aus Brüssel drohen hohe Strafen: Welche 
Autobauer zittern müssen’, Focus, 11 April 2019, www.focus.de).
34 E. Heymann, E-Mobilität: Ohne Subventionen (noch) in der Nische, Deutsche Bank 













IV. NOT READY FOR ELECTROMOBILITY
German companies most likely would have quickly overcome the cri‑
sis linked to Dieselgate if not for their unpreparedness for the rapid 
changes taking place on the market. While the German automotive 
industry was still investing a lot in combustion engines, electric engine 
technology developed rapidly worldwide. During the past eight years, 
the price of batteries has reduced fourfold to  150  euros per  1  kWh. 
The  development of electromobility may turn out to be the greatest 
revolution in the industry in decades. This change means that the fuel 
system and most of the components necessary for its correct operation 
will no longer be necessary. This will mean that Germany could lose its 
major advantage: decades of experience in developing specialist solu‑
tions for combustion engines. This will have grave consequences for the 
most important branch of the German economy.
The German automotive sector long delayed the decision to focus on 
developing electric cars, fearing that the German economy would lose 
its value ‑added and that its income generated by the sales of vehicles 
with combustion engines will be cannibalised. According to analysis con‑
ducted inside the sector, an electric car needs only 200 parts (a car with 
a combustion engine needs 1,400). For this reason, a major part of the 
German economy’s technological advantage regarding engines, fuel sys‑
tems, gear boxes and exhaust systems will no longer be essential. Manu‑
facturing effective lithium ‑ion cells is the key competence in the process 
of manufacturing electric cars. This is so because the performance of 
such cars depends on them. At present, the cost of a battery, around 
8,000–10,000  euros, may make up as much as  40% of a  car’s price.35 
The competence of producing battery cells has become the domain of 
electrochemical companies, mainly Asian ones. Since German automak‑
ers have not been interested in developing electromobility for years, 
35 S. Menzel, ‘Wandel zur E‑Mobilität: Vor allem Batteriezellen bereiten der Branche 













German research institutes have reduced their capabilities in this area. 
While in the past most German universities of technology had world‑
‑class competences in electrochemistry and electrophysics (which are key 
for electromobility), at present the development of these fields of study 
leaves much to be desired.36 This is coupled with the insufficient budgets 
of German research centres and their excessive bureaucratisation, which 
makes it difficult to attract world ‑class experts in the most innovative 
areas, such as artificial intelligence.37 Furthermore, German vehicle man‑
ufacturers were uncertain for a long time as to whether the electric car 
would really be the future of the automotive industry. As a result, none of 
their European subcontractors has mastered the technology of manufac‑
turing battery cells at competitive costs. Instead, their electric car mod‑
els are equipped with cells supplied by companies from China, Japan or 
South Korea. According to the European Commission’s estimates, in 2017 
the EU as a whole was five years behind Asia as regards the technologi‑
cal level of battery production. At present, this gap has been reduced to 
three years. In turn, industry experts estimated that Germany itself is 
ten years late. For this reason, the German automotive sector for a long 
time did not even pick up the gauntlet that had been thrown down by 
its Asian competitors. In 2018, Bosch was the last of German companies 
to announce that it would not decide to build a lithium ‑ion battery fac‑
tory on its own. The company’s directors emphasised that the enterprise 
would only be profitable if a 20% market share was achieved by 2030, 
which would require investments of 20 billion euros. For the time being, 
the entire demand for lithium ‑ion battery cells for German electric cars is 
satisfied solely by imports. In this aspect Germany is lagging behind even 
some EU member states – while factories of foreign companies manu‑
facturing battery cells already operate in Poland and Slovakia, the first 
plant in Germany, owned by China’s CATL, is still under construction.38
36 B. Gillmann, ‘Wolfgang Herrmann: “Ingenieure müssen politisch denken“’, Handels‑
blatt, 13 September 2019, www.handelsblatt.com.
37 Ibid.














The passiveness of German automakers has not slowed down the rapid 
development of electromobility, but it has opened the way for their com‑
petitors’ expansion on this market. This expansion is supported by gov‑
ernmental programs subsidising the purchase of electric cars launched 
in numerous highly developed countries. For example, Tesla is design‑
ing electric cars for wealthier clients, and Renault has focused on the 
sector of cheaper compact cars. Rapid progress in the area of electro‑
mobility has also been made by manufacturers from China, especially 
given the fact that the Chinese government is putting pressure on the 
automotive industry to ensure that electric cars have an  increasing 
share of production. According to forecasts presented by the Fraunhofer 
Institute, Germany has only six years to achieve the capability of bat‑
tery manu facturing, because electric cars will become a mass product 
starting from 2025. According to the German Institute for Employment 
Research, by 2035 the number of jobs linked to combustion engine pro‑
duction may be reduced by 114,000 (84,000 in vehicle manufacturing and 
30,000 in related areas). In effect, the economy will lose value ‑added of 
20 billion euros (0.6% of GDP).39 This effect will only be compensated 
to a small extent by the emergence of around 25,000 new jobs in the 
electro mobility sector because it takes 30%  less workforce to make 
an  electric car than a  combustion car. The most pessimistic calcula‑
tions have been presented by the Ifo Institute, according to which, if 
radical regulations banning combustion cars from cities are introduced, 
620,000 people in Germany will lose their jobs in the industry which 
manufactures engines for these cars.40
39 A. Mönnig, C. Schneemann, E. Weber, G. Zika, R. Helmrich, Elektromobilität 2035: 
Effekte auf Wirtschaft und Erwerbstätigkeit durch die Elektrifizierung des Antriebs-
strangs von Personenkraftwagen, IAB Forschungsbericht, no.  8/2018, Institute for 
Employment Research, p. 7, doku.iab.de.














V. CONCERNS ABOUT AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Many problems in the German automotive sector could have been 
avoided, if not for the tardiness in working on new technologies. The sec‑
tor for a long time ignored Tesla’s work on the development of autono‑
mous electric cars, depreciating them and seeing them as a rather unre‑
alistic attempt to conquer the automotive market by a small firm from 
Silicon Valley. However, technological progress and rapidly growing sales 
made it clear to Germans that Tesla may set a new trend in the global 
automotive industry. The vehicle digitalisation trend may pose an even 
more serious risk to German automakers than electromobility. If vehi‑
cles are reduced to autonomously moving devices in the future, and soft‑
ware becomes the criterion for choosing the optimal model instead of 
such parameters as driving comfort, a  large share of the value ‑added 
generated by the automotive industry will be taken over by IT tycoons. 
It is they who have huge funds available, a massive amount of data, the 
capability to analyse and process them, and the skills of developing effec‑
tive and user ‑friendly software. It is possible that the only thing remain‑
ing for German companies will be manufacturing the hardware, which 
may offer much lower margins. As Herbert Diess, the CEO of Volkswa‑
gen, stated in an interview, German companies have only a 50% chance 
of remaining among the top global carmakers in the coming decade. 
According to Diess, the highest risk is posed precisely by the digitalisa‑
tion trend.
Tesla’s market offer has for several years included cars partly capable 
of autonomous driving. However, human driver control is still neces‑
sary in cars operating in this mode. The overriding idea of many compa‑
nies from Silicon Valley is to create robot taxis that would be capable of 
autonomously transporting passengers. Companies which offer urban 
passenger transport will be able to pay more for such cars, hoping that 
the autonomous fleet will help them significantly cut the costs gener‑













of accident.41 Unless the German automotive sector catches up with the 
trends, it will lose its share in the important market of vehicles meant for 
driving in cities. Even if developing software for autonomous city driving 
is a challenge that will take decades to overcome, autonomous driving 
on motorways is a much simpler task, considering the significantly less 
complex situation on these roads. This kind of software is already in the 
phase of advance testing.
At present, German automakers are not at the forefront of work on auto‑
nomous cars. According to a survey conducted by Navigant Research, 
the leaders in this race are: Google’s subsidiary Waymo, General Motors 
and Ford. The German companies Volkswagen, Daimler (in co‑operation 
with Bosch) and BMW, and the entire group of eleven other manufactur‑
ers, have been recognised as lagging behind the technological  leaders.42 
The  test mileage achieved by autonomous car models in real ‑world 
driving is an imperfect indicator of the level of technological develop‑
ment of individual companies, though it is reliable to a certain extent. 
In turn, software quality can be assessed on the basis of the number of 
interventions from the driver controlling the vehicle per 1,000 miles of 
driving. Firms that have been authorised to test autonomous vehicles 
in California, which has the most liberal regulations in this area, are 
obliged to publish reports of this kind. These indicators also suggest that 
the leader of this classification is Waymo, with a mileage of autonomous 
vehicles of 1.27 million miles and 0.09 interventions per 1,000 miles. Next 
in the ranking is General Motors, with 447,000 miles and 0.19 interven‑
tions per 1000 miles.43 German automakers are underperformers in this 
ranking: Daimler’s autonomous vehicles have travelled 1,750  miles 
with 682  interventions per  1,000  miles, and BMW’s 41  miles with 
41 E. Rosenbaum, ‘An MIT‑trained Intel autonomous‑driving exec explains why Tesla, 
Uber and Lyft are in a  robo‑taxi race for their lives’, CNBC, 9 May 2019, www.cn‑ 
bc.com.
42 M. Phelan, ‘Detroit leads, Tesla lags in trillion‑dollar race for robot‑car business’, 
Detroit Free Press, 13 March 2019, eu.freep.com.














219 interventions per 1,000 miles (while more than ten other firms have 
already earned more expertise than these two). German companies are 
also engaged in testing autonomous driving in their research centres, 
and so their information resources are certainly richer than what the 
figures presented above might suggest. However, even Diess, the CEO 
of Germany’s largest vehicle manufacturer, has admitted that his firm 
is one to two years behind Waymo, though some analysts are of the 
opinion that this gap is at least five years.44 It cannot be ruled out that 
German companies will use systems developed by their external part‑
ners, but this will entail loss of value ‑added. For example, BMW closely 
co‑operates with Aptiv in the area of autonomous driving solutions in 
its latest vehicle models.
Furthermore, Germany is not among the top countries offering the best 
conditions for the development of autonomous vehicles. Germany is 
ranked eighth in the Autonomous Vehicles Readiness Index developed 
by KPMG, behind the Netherlands, Singapore, Norway, the USA, Swe‑
den, Finland and the United Kingdom.45 This means that the German 
automotive sector is not in a privileged position to be able to catch up 
with the top leaders in autonomous vehicle development and must test 
its solutions in the USA, relying on the knowledge of American experts. 
Germany is rated high in terms of the quality of traditional road and 
logistics infrastructure. However, it is ranked poorly as regards the avail‑
ability of the 4G network, the country’s administrative structure (it is 
too complex and impedes the development of standards on the national 
level) and consumers’ acceptance of autonomous cars.
In the longer run, introducing the option of using autonomous driving 
systems may completely change the public perception of cars. A car may 
cease to be a status symbol and will rather become a more functional 
44 J. Becker, ‘Überholspur ins Nichts?’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 27 March 2019, www.sued‑
deutsche.de.













gadget expected to provide access to the extensive multimedia entertain‑
ment offered during driving, while functional values linked to driving 
will gradually lose importance. In this scenario, the brand may lose sig‑
nificance for the consumer. Consequently, the margin for luxury vehicle 
makers, such as Audi, BMW or Daimler, will fall. Unfavourable social 
trends are already visible in Germany. According to a questionnaire com‑
missioned by Germany’s digital association Bitkom, brand is an essential 
criterion for only 62% of Germans during vehicle purchase. The more 
important ones include: integrated navigation systems (93%), price (91%), 
environmental impact (such as fuel consumption, 91%), user experience 
(88%), engine type (electric or combustion, 84%), steering support sys‑
tems (80%), design (79%), engine capacity (79%), services available on 
the basis of car data (such as repairs, 77%), or the vehicle’s compatibility 
with a smartphone (62%).46 Furthermore, six in ten Germans (includ‑
ing 58% of people older than 65 and 70% of people aged between 16 and 
29 years) believe that owning a car is no longer a status symbol. Accord‑
ing to another survey, 42% of German citizens aged between 18–25 would 
never be ready to give up anything to buy their own car, while in 2010 
this answer was chosen by only 29% of respondents in this age group.47 
It cannot be ruled out that some of these opinions are rather declarative, 
while in fact owning a car with a good brand is still an important value, 
although people may not be fully aware of this. As can be concluded 
from other surveys, buying a car is falling ever lower on young people’s 
priority list because their purchasing power and employment stability 
are much lower than those of their parents’ generation.48 Whatever the 
reasons for consumers’ attachment to a car brand, there is a serious risk 
that the popularity of traditional car brands will decline.
46 A.  Streim, C. Meinecke, N.  Teer, ‘Das Auto der Zukunft spaltet die Deutschen’, 
 Bit kom, 5 September 2019, www.bitkom.org.
47 ‘Jungen Städtern sind Autos nicht mehr wichtig’, Zeit Online, 19  April 2018, 
www.zeit.de.
48 N. Häring, ‘Das Märchen von den Millennials, die sich nicht für Besitz interessie‑













Even if, contrary to optimistic opinions, autonomous vehicles do not 
achieve self ‑driving capability without human control, installing more 
and more functional and effective systems of this kind will be a must for 
premium segment brands. German automakers still have a very strong 
position in this area. However, Americans are already outpacing them 
at the present stage as regards the scope of commercialisation of simpler 
autonomous driving systems. On top of that, even if Waymo does not 
decide to launch the production of its own vehicles and sells its solu‑
tions, for example to German companies, this will lead to a decrease in 
the vehicle manufacturer’s margin. As with electric cars, where a major 
share of the added value went to Asian battery manufacturers, the 
need to buy systems from subcontractors in the case of autonomous 
vehicles will limit the profitability of German premium brands (Audi, 
BMW, Daimler and Porsche). For example, according to data for 2018, 
vehicles of these brands accounted for only 43% of vehicles sold by Ger‑
man companies in total, but they generated as much as 60% of turnover 
and 75% of  profits.49 This is because selling a car in the premium sector 
generated much higher profits. In 2018, Volkswagen earned 954 euros 
per vehicle, while BMW earned 3,920 euros, Audi 2,611 euros, Daimler 
3,130 euros and  Porsche 13,667 euros.













VI. GERMANY’S STRUGGLE  
WITH THE AUTOMOTIVE CRISIS
The  long period of restructuring in the German automotive industry, 
during which it will not generate as high profits as over the past two dec‑
ades, is already not only a pessimistic scenario but rather a consequence 
of the challenges automakers and their subcontractors need to face.
None of the three factors that undermine the German automotive sec‑
tor’s competitiveness is short ‑term. Global economic tension is unlikely 
to ease. Many countries do not intend to tolerate a situation of an end‑
less macroeconomic imbalances that leads everywhere to the destabi‑
lisation of socio ‑economic systems. Principally, there is a consensus in 
the United States regarding the need to compete with China for primacy 
in the global economy. The United Kingdom has also demonstrated its 
readiness to seriously modify its contacts with the EU. Protectionist ten‑
dencies are strengthening in China and may lead to restrictions for the 
development of China‑EU trade. German vehicle manufacturers will find 
it extremely difficult to maintain the previous highly complex supply 
chain, given such unfavourable conditions. Even if they manage to pro‑
tect their position on foreign markets, they will do so as global brands 
with a smaller share of German value ‑added (as has already happened 
to American global digital corporations). As  a  consequence, Germa‑
ny’s direct benefits from exports to non‑EU markets may fall, because 
a greater share of this added value will be generated locally.
Nothing seems to suggest that the evolution of the automotive indus‑
try towards electromobility and digitalisation would be held back. Both 
American and Chinese companies allocate significant funds on innova‑
tion in these fields. Beijing does not hide its intention (declared in the 
government strategy ‘Made in China 2025’) of becoming a global manu‑
facturer of electric cars in the near future. This will weaken German 













global market.50 American firms from the IT sector are investing heavily 
in vehicle digitalisation software. Furthermore, the increasingly stricter 
climate regulations in the EU are forcing companies to sell more electric 
cars on the EU market. The development of the production technology of 
such vehicles is not unproblematic, and German manufacturers still have 
serious assets, such as knowledge of the market, a solid financial base, 
great technological potential and a well ‑developed distribution network. 
However, the dynamics of market trends is giving rise to a constantly 
growing risk that these companies’ role will be reduced to that of sub‑
contractors or brand owners whose tasks will be limited to assembling 
components increasingly originating from outside Germany. It seems 
that the challenges the German automotive sector is about to face can 
be best determined by the thought included in the German industrial 
policy guidelines published in February 2019: if batteries for electric cars 
originate from Asia and systems for autonomous cars originate from 
the United States, Europe will lose 50% of its added value in the automo‑
tive sector.51 Unless German automakers introduce major innovations 
in the areas of electromobility and digitalisation, in the longer term they 
may face the risk of losing their position as the world’s strongest auto‑
motive corporations, and the entire EU industry may lose a major share 
of added value. This would adversely affect not only Germany’s economic 
situation and political stability, but also the competitiveness of the entire 
European economy.
50 Proof of China’s ambitions includes attempts to buy shares in German automo‑
tive companies. The news that one of China’s largest automotive companies, Geely, 
bought a 9.69% stake in Daimler, thus becoming its largest shareholder, provoked 
a  scandal in Germany over the past few weeks. The  Chinese company resorted 
to accounting tricks to circumvent German regulations imposing the obligation 
to inform in public of any acquisition of stocks above the 3% and 5% thresholds. 
In effect of this transaction Geely may gain access to Daimler’s key information and 
influence the company’s strategic decisions.
51 Nationale Industriestrategie 2030: Strategische Leitlinien für eine deutsche und euro-














Germany is likely to respond to the automotive sector’s challenges by 
intensifying action on three levels: sectoral, national and international.
1. Transformation of the automotive sector
The largest share of the tasks linked to the automotive industry’s trans‑
formation will rest with the carmakers themselves. German companies 
will be forced to develop new business models in order to capitalise on 
some of their old advantages whilst simultaneously developing new 
ones. For a long time their response to electromobility has been limited 
to attempts to adapt part of the electric drive to the existing platforms 
for combustion models. This cautious strategy serves to limit the losses 
in case electric cars turned out to be merely a  rich clients’ fad; how‑
ever, it has also resulted in poorer capacity of the electric cars on offer. 
The German automotive sector has already realised there is no turning 
point from electromobility. Volkswagen was the first German automaker 
to declare a radical technology shift and has allocated 60 billion euros on 
investments in electromobility and digitalisation. VW embarked upon 
designing a platform dedicated only to electric cars, hoping to set new 
standards in the industry this way. If this plan is successful, the firm will 
be able to manufacture cars that will have performance equal to Tesla’s 
while reducing the prices owing to mass production. The direction of 
change set by Volkswagen is already translating into losses for its numer‑
ous subcontractors as VW is discontinuing its orders for further improve‑
ment of combustion vehicle systems with dim prospects. Many firms 
already have problems with remaining on the market because an elec‑
tric vehicle requires different competences and its production involves 
a lower workload. In the pessimistic scenario, a sudden withdrawal from 
financing investments in combustion technologies may lead to the need 
to restructure entire regions (as was the case with restructuring min‑
ing areas) which have for decades been building the automotive clus‑
ter manufacturing combustion engines, especially diesels. This would 
particularly affect regions in southern Germany. The crisis might also 













in the electromechanical industry manufacture specialist machines and 
equipment dedicated solely for manufacturing combustion vehicles.
New technologies pose a huge threat to German premium vehicle mak‑
ers who may be forced to radically modify their business model. So far, 
luxury has been defined by car performance. BMW and Daimler ordered 
the  production of numerous components from their subcontractors 
and the brands themselves focused on making the most valuable units 
(i.e.  the engine and other elements of the drive train) in the best pos‑
sible way. German subcontractors, such as Bosch, Continental and ZF, do 
not have lithium ‑ion battery production technology. Therefore, they are 
focusing on producing electronics, software and drive train components 
for electric cars, thus entering a field which has so far been reserved 
for brand owners.52 These latter may be left with little opportunity to 
generate value ‑added. They need to face the difficult task of defining 
how luxury should be understood in the case of electric cars. It seems 
that the only way in which quality and innovation can be offered in the 
segment of premium cars is to create another generation of software for 
auto nomous cars.53
The  development of new technologies in the automotive sector may 
be impeded by a  phenomenon known from the energy transforma‑
tion period: once conventional energy companies began to be viewed 
as entities which were set to be liquidated soon, their capitalisation 
began to fall, and thus they found it more difficult to obtain loans for 
further development. The beginnings of similar tendencies can be seen 
on the automotive market. Even though autonomous vehicles are a rel‑
atively distant future and are still more of a promise of a technological 
breakthrough, they are already popular among investors. On 3 Febru‑
ary 2020, Tesla’s market capitalisation exceeded US$132 billion for the 
first time, achieving a  higher value than the market value of BMW 
52 ‘Continental befürchtet auch 2020 maue Autokonjunktur’, Der Spiegel, 12 Novem‑
ber 2019, www.spiegel.de.













and VW combined. This in spite of the fact that Tesla in 2019 had sold 
367,000 vehicles, i.e. 37 times less than BMW (2.5 million) and VW (11 mil‑
lion) combined. Even though Tesla has generated significant financial 
losses since the beginning, it can still count on financing by holding new 
stock issues – investors view this strategy as setting a reliable market 
development trend. The  consequences of these changes may include 
falling demand for the securities of traditional automakers, who will be 
branded as inflexible and technologically outdated. The stocks of BMW 
and Daimler over the past two years have been among the worst ‑priced 
amid Germany’s 30 major companies listed on the DAX. Over the past few 
weeks, Continental (one of the top German subcontractors) surprised its 
shareholders by informing them about a significant deterioration in its 
market future partly due to the popularity of solutions linked to elec‑
tromobility. Many German small and medium ‑sized companies already 
at this stage expect low ‑interest loans from the federal government for 
the transformation towards new automotive technologies.
2. The German government’s moves on the national level
The German automotive industry’s transformation will be successful 
on condition that the state effectively leads the process of structural 
changes. The state should support the sector of subcontractors (poten‑
tially the largest victim of the vehicle electromobility and digitalisation 
trends) and rebuild the research and development competences in the 
areas necessary for conducting the transformation. This will require the 
government’s active engagement in initiating, coordinating and subsi‑
dising the transformation processes. This is a completely new situation 
for German state institutions which have shunned such deep engage‑
ment in economic processes so far. The assumptions of Germany’s new 
industrial policy published in February 2019 by Minister Peter Altmaier 
are a manifestation of Germany’s readiness to accept the challenge and 
alter the model existing to date. They have been criticised by numerous 














The greatest challenge for the federal government will be reconciling 
the sector’s interests, i.e. those of German automotive industry tycoons 
wanting a rapid transformation and to catch up with the technological 
leaders, as well as the interests of subcontractors from the sector of small 
and medium ‑sized enterprises whose further existence on the mar‑
ket may be jeopardised by overly rapid changes. Recent developments 
have further added to this dilemma. 70,000 workers of the automotive 
industry’s subcontractors protested under the ‘fair transformation’ slo‑
gan in June 2019 during a meeting of CEOs of the vehicle manufacturers 
and representatives of the central government and the federal states at 
a summit devoted to the automotive industry.54 Trade union activists 
insisted on establishing a special fund financed by the automakers and 
the state that would offer a low ‑interest loan to companies embarking on 
the transformation towards electromobility.55 In turn, the manufactur‑
ers expected (and still expect) subsidies for the implementation of new 
technologies, the mobilisation of public funds and active engagement of 
the state administration. This is intended to contribute to creating the 
best possible ecosystem for the development of new automotive tech‑
nologies. This is hampered to a great extent by the still very low sales 
of electric cars on the domestic market. Fully electric cars accounted 
for only 0.14% of the 57 million cars on the roads in Germany in 2018.56 
52,900 new fully electric cars (1.7%) and 35,400 plug‑in hybrids (1.2%) 
were bought in Germany between January and October 2019. The total 
of 143,000 electric cars sold on the German market has not lived up to 
Chancellor Merkel’s ambitions expressed a few years ago that around 
a million of these cars would be seen on German roads in 2020. There 
should be around 7–10 million electric cars on German roads by 2030 for 
Germany’s transport sector to fulfil the EU climate goals it has been set.
54 M.‑W. Buchenau, F. Hubik, ‘Wo die Antriebswende zur Elektromobilität Tausende 
Jobs bedroht’, Handelsblatt, 30 June 2019, www.handelsblatt.com.
55 ‘IG Metall fordert Milliardenfonds für Autozulieferer’, Handelsblatt, 18 June 2019, 
www.handelsblatt.com.














So far, German consumers’ lack of interest in buying electric vehicles 
has not only been due to the prices but also due to the insufficient devel‑
opment of the charging infrastructure. In 2017, Germany was ranked 
7th in the EU in terms of the number of charging points (70 per 100,000 
city residents). It was far behind not only such small countries as the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Sweden, but also France, the size of 
whose territory is comparable.57 It cannot be ruled out that Germany’s 
position will improve in the near future. In 2018–2019, the total number 
of charging station grew by 144%, to 16,500.58 The government has ambi‑
tious plans to increase the number of charge points by 250%, i.e. to 70,000, 
by 2021. Subsidies worth a total of 3.5 billion euros, which need to be used 
by 2025, are expected to help in achieving this goal. The subsidy for elec‑
tric car purchase is also expected to be increased from the present level 
of 4,000 euros to 6,000 euros (in the case of cars which cost a maximum 
of 40,000 euros). This solution may apply to as many as 700,000 cars.59
In the case of a slump on the global market and a more serious reduc‑
tion of the German automotive industry’s revenues in the coming years, 
the government is likely to take even more decisive measures to support 
sales in Germany – possibly something like the programme implemented 
in 2009 when subsidies for scrapping old cars and buying new ones were 
introduced.
3. Germany’s moves on the EU and global arena
There is no doubt that EU law will be used to protect the interests of 
the German automotive industry. The more Germany feels it is on the 
back foot in terms of technology, the more it will be open to the French 
demands for “Europe’s stronger industrial and digital sovereignty”. 
57 ‘Electric vehicle charging points’, European Commission, ec.europa.eu.
58 Anzahl der Ladestationen für Elektrofahrzeuge in Deutschland im Zeitraum 
2. Quartal 2018 bis 2. Quartal 2020, Statista, 5 May 2020, de.statista.com.
59 K. Stratmann, M. Murphy, S. Menzel, M. Fasse, J. Hildebrand, ‘Steuermilliarden 














Berlin has already agreed to subsidising the setting up of European con‑
sortiums tasked with manufacturing electric batteries. Just a few years 
back it would have been unthinkable for Germany to come up with a pro‑
posal like this because it wanted the model of the EU to remain as free‑
‑market as possible. The factors that contributed to changing Germany’s 
mindset included the worsening condition of the German automotive 
industry and the launch of Brexit. London was opposed to the state’s 
active engagement in the economy even more than Berlin. Meanwhile, 
Germany will no longer passively watch China take over further sectors 
through subsidies, as happened in the past to the once very promising 
photovoltaic sector. Germany has less and less qualms about building 
mechanisms that would use EU legislation to block the moves of Ameri‑
can digital giants which are using their dominance in the area of data 
analysis for expansion in the automotive sector.
German automakers have so far contributed to strengthening Asian 
battery cell manufacturers’ competitive advantage on the market by 
signing long ‑term supply contracts.60 Politicians became seriously con‑
cerned about the slow rate of electromobility development and forced 
the domestic automotive sector to become more engaged in enhancing 
European capabilities in the area of lithium ‑ion battery cell production. 
Peter Altmaier, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, in Novem‑
ber 2018 promised to support the construction of battery factories in 
Germany with subsidies worth 1 billion euros by 2021. The programme 
has been coordinated with some EU member states (including France 
and Poland). Therefore, new plants will be set up as part of the Impor‑
tant Projects of Common European Interest initiative. This guarantees 
60 BMW signed a contract worth 1.5 billion euros under which it will buy battery cells 
from the factory of China’s CATL which is under construction in Erfurt. It  also 
signed a contract worth 2.5 billion euros envisaging battery cell supplies from China, 
and a contract with Samsung SDI. BMW itself guarantees cobalt supplies to these 
firms. Volkswagen has signed battery cell supply contracts worth a total of 20 bil‑
lion euros with CATL, LG Chem and Samsung SDI, and will need battery cells worth 














that Brussels will readily accept subsidies for them. Two consortiums 
are certain to receive subsidies: the German ‑French consortium formed 
by BMW, Opel, PSA, Saft and Varta (amongst other companies); and 
the European one which will be created by BMW, BASF, Volkswagen, 
Sweden’s Northvolt, and companies from Belgium, Poland and Italy.61 
The projects may receive a total of 3.2 billion euros of subsidies which 
will be co‑funded by the governments of individual member states. 
According to plans of the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy, European manufacturers are expected to satisfy one third of 
the EU’s demand for batteries in 2025–2030. This means that a produc‑
tion potential of 600–1500 GWh needs to be built in the EU by 2030.62 
However, the latest economic development forecasts do not provide 
hope for this. In the opinion of Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, by 2028, 
46 factories with a total production capacity of 1000 GWh will be located 
in China alone, while only nine plants with a total production potential 
of 248 GWh will operate in the EU.
The European Union also heavily relies on Chinese supplies of the raw 
materials necessary for battery production – 66% of the world’s graphite 
deposits are located in China. Furthermore, Beijing has imposed the obli‑
gation to manufacture these components in China. Local battery manu‑
facturers may count on considerable state support. European companies 
have no chance of similar privileges. In case Beijing’s protectionist pol‑
icy impedes market entrance, German companies will certainly expect 
Brussels to resolve these issues. In case the EU’s economic relations with 
China and the USA deteriorate, it cannot be ruled out that Germany 
will agree to impose a CO2 limit tax on manufacturers from countries 
where CO2 emission levels are high.
61 ‘EU‑Gigafactory  – der zweite Batteriezellen‑Verbund steht’, Manager Magazin, 
6 September 2019, www.manager‑magazin.de.
62 Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Oliver Krischer, Kerstin Andreae, Stephan Kühn 
( Dresden) u. a. der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN betr.: „Beschleunigung der 














EU institutions may also be used by Germany in the technological race 
against the US automotive industry. The manufacturers of Germany’s 
premium car brands will want to catch up with the leading autono‑
mous driving system developers, such as Google ‑owned Waymo, as soon 
as possible. However, Germany fears that American digital companies 
may be privileged in this technological race because they have vast 
data resources and data analysis tools, which makes it easier to create 
more precise algorithms. Besides, they will be able to offer perfect inter‑
operability of systems and applications with the software installed in 
the cars. One example of the failure to catch up with US manufacturers 
was the failure of the joint initiative of Daimler and BMW intended at 
creating a competitor for Uber, a multinational ride ‑hailing company. 
They gave up their project known as ‘Share now’ due to excessive losses 
just before the end of 2019. The fact that two leading German carmakers 
have been beaten by a medium ‑sized company from Silicon Valley may 
serve as proof for Germany that it should apply pressure on Brussels 
to adopt legislation that will weaken the monopoly position of Ameri‑
can digital companies and to ensure that European consumers’ data are 
stored on European servers.63 Nor can it be ruled out that a digital tax 
targeted at American companies will be imposed at the EU level, espe‑
cially if the USA decides to impose an import duty on vehicles originat‑
ing from the EU.














VII. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR CENTRAL EUROPE
Investments made by German automakers and their subcontractors 
have been among the key factors strengthening economic links between 
Germany and Central Europe over the past two decades. The weakening 
of Germany’s automotive industry may completely change the nature of 
economic relations between them and Central Europe, which will give 
rise to both major threats and new development opportunities for this 
region.
1. New threats…
Over the past few years, investments made by German vehicle manufac‑
turers have been a major development trigger, especially in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The reduction of their scale will put those 
countries’ economic model to the test and will provide an answer to the 
question whether their reliance on the automotive industry has reached 
a level that poses a threat to those countries’ macroeconomic stability.
Each of the aforementioned challenges the German automotive industry 
needs to face may pose a threat to companies based in Central Europe. 
The requirement to move a greater share of their production to non‑EU 
markets will reduce exports from all factories owned by German cor‑
porations – not only those located in Germany but also those in Central 
Europe. According to UNCTAD, the automotive industry accounted for 
20% of Czech, 16% of Hungary’s and 30% of Slovakia’s exports, while the 
average ratio for the EU as a whole was 12%. Poland was significantly 
less dependent on the automotive industry, since this sector’s produc‑
tion accounted for only 11% of its exports. The manufacture of electric 
cars will require fewer inputs, the demand for the production of Central 
European factories and subcontractors will also fall and many of these 
heavily rely on manufacturing components for combustion vehicles 
will also fall. In Poland the technological changes may adversely affect 













(these are mainly manufacturers of combustion engines and their parts, 
gear boxes, clutches, other elements of the drive train, radiators and 
exhaust systems).64 Vehicle digitalisation poses an equally high threat 
since it may increase the added value of the electrotechnical, electro‑
chemical and IT sectors at the expense of the industrial sectors in which 
Central Europe has become specialised. According to Eurostat, the share 
of industrial production’s value ‑added65 in GDP in 2018 reached 27% in 
the Czech Republic, 21% in Hungary, 22% in Poland and 23% in Slovakia, 
while the average EU level was 17%.
A  symbiosis was created between German and Central European fac‑
tories during the boom on the global markets and a division of labour 
was formed. As  a  result, factories based in Central Europe manufac‑
tured cheaper models and carried out more time ‑consuming tasks. 
A strong sector of subcontractors manufacturing simpler components 
thus formed there. In turn, the production of more expensive models 
and almost all the research and development remained in the previous 
locations (mostly in Germany). Much stronger tensions and competition 
for the production of new models and workplaces may arise between 
German and Central European plants during the period of thorough 
transformation and restructuring of the sector. The German govern‑
ment will make pressure (and offer financial incentives) so that German 
manufacturers’ investments above all support the transformation of the 
domestic automotive sector. Similar pressure can be expected from Ger‑
man trade unions. According to German law, companies must receive 
approval from the work council before they can move production outside 
Germany. Representatives of German workers are also members of auto‑
motive companies’ supervisory boards. Volkswagen is especially sensi‑
tive to political influence – representatives of the Lower Saxony federal 
state, which owns a 20% stake in the company, have the right to veto the 
company’s strategic decisions.
64 K.  Zduniuk, Nowa era motoryzacji. Jak odnajdzie się w  niej polski przemysł?, Bank 
Pekao, 2019, p. 16, www.pekao.com.pl.













The example of Škoda Auto is a good illustration of the situation in Cen‑
tral Europe. This company’s performance for years served as a perfect 
demonstration of the mutual benefits Germany and the Czech Republic 
derive from co‑operation in the automotive sector. In the last decade of 
the 20th century, Volkswagen was gradually acquiring stakes in the Czech 
factory to ultimately become its sole owner. Germans made the needed 
investments in Škoda, improved its technological level and designed 
the brand practically anew. Over the past years, its vehicles have been 
among the bestsellers not only on the EU market but also in China, India 
and Russia (among other countries). Škoda’s foreign expansion filled the 
Czech economy with pride, ensuring decent export incomes and increas‑
ing investments in R&D. In 2018 alone, the company generated 5% of the 
Czech Republic’s GDP and 9% of its exports, thus becoming the country’s 
largest employer and taxpayer. Although Škoda was breaking new sales 
records, VW’s management liked less and less the fact that it was evolv‑
ing from a manufacturer of cheap cars towards the medium class, offer‑
ing practically the same solutions as Volkswagen for a lower price and 
gradually taking over clients from other brands belonging to the group.66 
These moves were tolerated as long as the German company’s situation 
remained stable. However, Volkswagen announced in 2019 that, given 
the need to cut costs and improve profitability in order to become pre‑
pared for new challenges, it intended to restructure the brands portfolio 
so that they did not cannibalise each other. It is expected that Škoda will 
be the greatest victim of these moves.67 It was decided that it would again 
become a cheap brand addressed, for example, to clients from develop‑
ing countries (offering cars within a price range of 10,000–20,000 euros 
per car) and would compete with such European carmakers as Dacia, 
which is owned by France’s Renault. The restructuring process may take 
a few years, and changes in Czech factories will be introduced gradu‑
ally; unless this is accelerated by a potential sales collapse on the global 
66 D.H. Lamparter, ‘Volkswagen: Schafft er das?’, Zeit Online, 30 June 2016, www.zeit.de.














automotive market. The brand transformation may lead to losses for the 
Czech economy because the new Škoda will most likely become a car 
generating lower margins and involving much lower saturation with 
advanced technologies. As a consequence, VW may reduce investment 
in R&D in the Czech plants and limit the demand for highly qualified 
specialists, for example marketing specialists. This also gives rise to the 
threat that in the case of such countries as India and Russia, which are 
expected to become the main markets of Škoda, a large section of the 
production may be made locally in those countries.
Subcontractors’ profitability may be further threatened as corporations 
will use their dominant position to force them to comply with climate 
protection standards. Since Dieselgate, German manufacturers have 
been looking for new ways of manifesting their determination to reduce 
CO2 emissions and to show their climate responsibility. One example of 
this is the series of Volkswagen’s electric cars – ID. The company has also 
promised that it will make efforts to manufacture these vehicles in a cli‑
mate neutral manner. A similar course of action has been declared by 
the CEO of Daimler. This change in the manner of production will have 
huge consequences for the subcontractors’ sector since they generate on 
average around 70% of a vehicle’s value ‑added68 and thus it is they who 
will have the dominant share of responsibility for reducing CO2 emis‑
sions during the production process. The largest German subcontractors, 
such as Bosch, ZF or Continental, are already preparing themselves for 
the challenge and are negotiating loans with banks for lower ‑emission 
technologies. However, higher expenses on climate policy may put 
at risk the survival of many subcontractors in Germany who already 
have problems due to low profitability levels. According to the German 
Foundry Association’s estimates, 60% out of 600 domestic companies of 
this kind make a major share of their production for the needs of the 
automotive industry, using mainly such fuels as coke and natural gas. 
68 M.‑W. Buchenau, S. Menzel, A. Müller, R. Tyborski, ‘CO2‑Pläne der Autobauer gefähr‑













Subcontractors from Central Europe are also likely to face such problems 
and may suffer from such ambitious climate protection plans.
Similar threats to Central European subcontractors may also be linked 
to the industry 4.0 concept. This envisages (amongst other things) build‑
ing a network of intelligent factories which will be able to significantly 
improve digital coordination, for example, between the corporations’ and 
subcontractors’ plants. This will definitely streamline their collaboration 
and accelerate the flow of information. However, from the subcontrac‑
tors’ viewpoint this will create a higher risk that the corporations will 
gain more control and much more extensive access to data. This means 
that they will be able to apply increasingly stronger pressure on price 
reduction and save much more money owing to investments in indus‑
try 4.0 at the expense of subcontractors.
In response to the requirement to locate a significantly greater share of 
production on non‑EU markets, German companies may demand increas‑
ing engagement in foreign expansion from their subcontractors.69 This 
course of development may be difficult to follow for small and medium‑
‑sized Central European companies which lack the sufficient capital and 
organisational capabilities to be able to invest on the much tougher non‑
‑European markets.
2. …and new opportunities
Besides the new threats that come along with the shake‑up caused by the 
technological challenges and the risks linked to increasing protectionism, 
there are also some opportunities for the Central European automotive 
sector. Certainly, not all German corporations’ multiannual subcontrac‑
tors from Germany will be able to continue their operation on the market, 
even if they may count on the government’s support. This means that 














the automakers will be forced to look for new subcontractors in place 
of  their traditional partners. This gap may be filled by some Central 
European firms that will use the opportunity of entering a higher level 
in the supply chain, especially if they manage to cope with the challenge 
of expansion onto markets outside the EU.
It cannot be ruled out that Germany will continue investing in plants 
manufacturing combustion vehicles in Central Europe in the short and 
medium term. This market segment is still set to generate an essential 
sales volume in the EU for years. Therefore, German companies may 
move a larger share of their combustion vehicle production to Central 
Europe in order to achieve as high margins as possible. At the same time 
they may allocate all the resources left into the R&D of new automotive 
technologies, especially in Germany. In the same time new workplaces 
linked to obsolete combustion vehicle production will still be created in 
Central Europe. However, these will be investments into declining tech‑
nologies that will not entail essential investments in innovation needed 
for Central Europe.
In  case the German automotive sector focuses on restructuring their 
plants in Germany, Central Europe’s trade and investment flows may be 
quickly diversified, and Germany’s share in this area may fall signifi‑
cantly. If the region’s productivity remains on a similar level, Asian elec‑
tric carmakers will certainly become engaged in it because the EU will 
continue to be a very important market for them for at least a decade 
or so. This trend is already visible in the sector of production of lithium‑
‑ion cells and batteries for electric vehicles. There is an LG Chem factory 
located near Wrocław in Poland. After its planned development in 2020 
it is expected to become the world’s largest battery cell production plant, 
with a production potential of 70 GWh. The company is already planning 
to build another plant in Poland.70 In turn, a Samsung SDI factory (with 
a production potential of 3 GWh) operates in Hungary, and a plant of 
SK Innovation (7.5 GWh) is set to be launched there soon.













The most important question is whether Central European companies 
will be able to develop new competences in the areas of the production 
systems and software for electric vehicles. Some of them may be able 
to create a production cluster of parts in the chain of supplies for elec‑
tric vehicles, especially given the fact that well ‑motivated and qualified 
employees remain the region’s greatest asset. Another opportunity for 
subcontractors from Central Europe will be presented by the attempt to 
take the role of an integrator assembling more complex electric vehicle 
units from components available on the market.71 Their cost advantage 
will help them achieve high competitiveness in this area, even if this 
activity does not generate the highest margins. This trend is already 
 visible in the region in the machine ‑building sector.
If collaboration with German automakers ceases to be such a  strong 
development trigger for Central Europe as it proven so far, the compa‑
nies forming the region’s automotive sector may tighten co‑operation 
between themselves independently of German firms. Many regional 
companies have significant competences in the area of combustion vehi‑
cle production – the Czech Republic in the area of the management and 
marketing of a global brand (Škoda is already one); Slovakia in the area 
of premium car assembly; Hungary in the area of advanced engine pro‑
duction; and Poland in the area of manufacturing vehicle components. 
Central European automotive companies may even face a dilemma as to 
whether intensified co‑operation between them without the involvement 
of German firms would not even place them in a better position in the 
supply chain of the automobile market than before. Such co‑operation 
might lead to the foundation of a separate corporation, entering a higher 
level in the combustion vehicle production chain, and gaining a stronger 
position in negotiations with global corporations.
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71 O. Wyman, ‘Automobilindustrie vor stürmischen Zeiten’, op. cit.
